Abstract: Executives use a variety of manipulative games to maximize the value of their gifts, including backdating, spring-loading, bullet-dodging and insider information. We find that executives exploit a legal loophole to backdate their gifts. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one year after the gift date. We find this pattern is stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the backdating hypothesis. We suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the requirements of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws. 
Introduction
Studies have shown that corporate insiders tend to make favorable charitable gifts just prior to a severe decline in the company's share prices. 1 The timing of these gifts is troubling, as it seems to suggest that the corporate insiders may have acted using material, non-public information to reap an unfair benefit. Many of these donations were made at a time when it would have been illegal to make a sale of the same securities due to their access to this information.
To explore whether these timing games are general and whether these manipulations continue to this day, we analyze these timing games around gifts of common stock by corporate executives using a comprehensive dataset covering 1986-2014. Specifically, we investigate five non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses for executives' motivations regarding the timing of their gifts in their own firms' stock: 1) wait until after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax-deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) engage in backdating of the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside information about the future prospects of their own firms stock to maximize their donation and
tax-deductions (inside-information).
Unlike previous studies that use very limited sample of firms or very limited time periods, we investigate these motivations for the timing of gifts by utilizing a comprehensive database that includes all gifts of common stock where executives gift the stock of their own firms, in all publicly listed firms in the United States. Our data covers all reported gifts of common stock and contains over 200,000 observations. The total volume of gifts contained in our dataset is approximately 9.5 billion shares, with a dollar value of approximately $300 billion.
Consequently, our findings are general and apply to all executives' gifts of their firm's stock.
Given the large dollar volume of gifts covered and the comprehensive nature of the study, our findings are important from legal, economic, as well as public policy perspectives.
Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed over the time period of 1986-2014. Our research demonstrates that each of our five hypotheses explain at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving of stock in the United States during this time period. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one year after the gift date. We find this pattern is stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the fraudulent backdating hypothesis. We also find that almost two-thirds of gifts are reported late, taking advantage of an exception in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 2 further contributing to the lax regulatory conditions that make it easy to manipulate the timing of gifts. We suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the requirements of SOX as well as general anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws.
Our finding that executives' gifts are well-timed also has economic and policy implications for the federal tax laws. Under U.S. tax law, the donor of gifts of stock to public or private charitable foundations may obtain a personal income tax deduction for the market value of the shares while simultaneously avoiding the capital gains tax that would be due if the shares were sold. 3 Furthermore, although open market sales of stock are undoubtedly within the purview of federal insider trading law, whether stock gifts to charity are so constrained is an unresolved question. 4 These loopholes create an opportunity for exploitation: empirical evidence suggest that corporate insiders use their access to inside information to time their stock donations prior to price declines, increasing their federal income tax deductions.
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To address these issues, this paper proceeds as follows. Section I offers, by way of background, a discussion of previous studies on executives' gifts of common stock. Section II analyzes the legal issues presented by timing gifts of stock. Section III contains our empirical findings together with the legal implications of those findings. In Section IV we offer proposals 2 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 3 Suppose that a stock purchased at $100 was gifted when the stock price reached $200 and subsequently, the stock price declined back to $50 after the gifting. In this case, the individual can take a deduction for $200 instead of holding a share worth $50. 4 Yermack, supra note 1, at 107. 5 Id.
distribution of tax liabilities, and net disposable income among donors and donees, are important determinants of donations as well as matters of public policy. 13 Very few studies have looked specifically at CEOs' stock gifts. Four studies are of note:
the first conducted by Yang-Ho Kim and Man-U Lee, 14 the second by Woon-Oh Jung and Sung
Ook Park, 15 the third by David Yermack 16 and the last by Sudip Ghosh and Maretno A.
Harjoto. 17 In the first paper, Professors Kim and Lee examine the transfers and subsequent cancellations of stock gifts in the period between 1993 and 2002 by South Korean controlling shareholders attempting to minimize their gift tax. 18 They discover that prior to 2000, executives donated stocks to their families on the days they estimated that the stock prices would be at local minimums. 19 If stock prices went on dropping after the donation dates, executives cancelled the gifts. 20 After a more restrictive gift-tax valuation rule for stock gifts was enacted in Korea in 2000, however, the incidence of this form of passive timing manipulation decreased significantly. 21 Professors Jung and Park, in the second study, analyze stock gifts of controlling shareholders to their families in Korea for the 2000-2004 period. Their study finds that companies would depress their stock prices close to these transfer dates by disclosing negative 13 Studies typically support the importance of tax policy on donor behavior. Although they suggest other factors affecting donor behavior exist, studies have provided conflicting evidence about the relative significance of these factors. For example, Professor William Randolph finds evidence that income elasticity is important, and because people have a tendency to smooth their consumption over time, the volume of donations is affected by transitory income elasticity as well as permanent price elasticity. William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions. 103 J. POL. ECON. 709 (1995) . On the other hand, Professor Gerald Auten and colleagues argue that transitory income and tax effects have no impact on gift-giving behavior -what matters are the persistent tax and income effects. Since tax policies have long-lasting effects on company income level, they are the most important elements that determine the amount and timing of donations. Entities adjust donations more on based on tax regulation than on based on income shocks. news to or withholding positive news from the market, thereby reducing the donor's gift taxes.
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In the third study, Professor Yermack considers 150 stock gifts made by public company
Chairmen and CEOs to their family charities in the US, 23 and finds inflated stock prices around the days of gift. Increased stock prices provide income tax shields, and an opportunity to offset capital gains yields to donors in the US. In the last study, Professors Ghosh and Harjoto find price movements in the US market similar to those described in Professor Yermack's study.
Executives time their donations to benefit from tax advantages.
The motivations that affect stock prices around gift dates in Korea are different from those that affect such prices in the U.S. Historically, most Korean companies were effectively managed by their controlling shareholders and their families, 24 and aspects of the huge, multiconglomerate, family-controlled "chaebol" system still persist today. 25 Controlling families maximize and propagate their personal wealth by donating shares to their children. 26 However, the extremity of inheritance and gift taxes, which maxes out at 50% in Korea, force executives to look for astute ways to protect their level of wealth. 27 Professors Kim and Lee document that before the Korean law began to use time periods after the gift date to calculate the gift tax on stock gifts, executives gave stocks to their families when they estimated the stock prices would not drop further. 28 In line with this policy, they cancelled donations if stock prices continued to drop. 29 This is a passive strategy: executives do not change the timing of information disclosures, nor do they attempt back dating in order to minimize stock prices around the date of donation; rather, they use their insider information to find the most appropriate date.
30
In 2000, the Korean law changed its valuation base for assessing the gift tax on a stock gift to the average market value of the underlying stock over the four-month period encompassing the two months before and two months after the gift date. The tax benefits stemming from the charitable donation of stock depend on the length of time the stock is held, whether the stock is closely or publicly held, and whether the recipient of the gift is a public or private entity. Generally, for the charitable contribution of stock, any excess not deductible in the year of contribution is carried forward for up to five subsequent tax years. 64 The contribution of any stock held long-term -that is, for more than one year 65 - permits the donor to deduct the fair market value of contributed stock. 66 The contribution of any securities held short-term -for one year or less -limits the deduction to the lower of the donor's cost basis and the fair market value of the security.
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The contribution of long-term marketable stock to public charities permits the donor to deduct the fair market value of the donated stock in an amount up to 30% of the donor's adjusted gross income (AGI), with a five-year carry-forward; cost basis is not taken into account. 68 In the case of short-term marketable stock contributed to public charities, the donor's deduction is the lower of donor's cost basis and the stocks' fair market value, and is limited to 50% of the donor's AGI. 69 The fair market value of the contributed marketable stock is the mean between the high and low price on the date of the contribution.
70
Taxpayers who contribute marketable stock to a private foundation receive more limited tax benefits. Donors are subject to a maximum deduction of 20% of AGI for contributions to private foundations. 71 Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares; however, if the donor contributes stock valued at over 10% of all of the corporation's outstanding shares, the deduction becomes the donor's cost basis for the additional amount. 72 For contributions of short-term stock, the donor's cost basis deduction is limited to 30% of AGI.
Contributions of closely held stock to public charities or donor-advised funds are subject to the same deduction, AGI limitation, and carry-forward rules as those for contributions of marketable securities. For transfers of closely held stock to private foundations, donors are permitted only a deduction equal to the lower of their cost basis or fair market value, subject to a cap of 20% of AGI with the five-year carry-forward. 73 Furthermore, if the donor claims a value in excess of $5,000 for the donation of securities that are not publicly traded, the value of the donation must be established by an independent appraisal conforming to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Regulations. 74 In a nutshell, the appraisal must be prepared by a qualified appraiser who has earned a designation from a recognized professional organization. 75 The appraisal must include a description of the property transferred, the date of contribution, any terms or conditions put on the property transferred, information on the qualified appraiser, the basis for making the valuation, the appraiser's signature, and the date of the appraisal. 76 Further, the appraisal must be made within 60 days of the date of gift. 77 The donor must attach an appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283), signed by both donee and appraiser, to her tax return.
78
The federal income tax law may also impose an "excess business holdings" tax on private
foundations. 79 This rule limits a private foundation's ownership of voting stock in a particular corporation to 20%, less the percent of voting stock owned by "any disqualified persons." 80 This 20% ceiling is increased to 35% if the voting control of the corporation is effectively held by unrelated third parties who are not disqualified persons. 81 A private foundation that violates this rule will be subject to an initial tax equal to 10% of the excess holdings. 82 If the foundation continues to have excess business holdings, it will be penalized with an additional 200% excise tax.
83 73 Id. § 170(b)(1)(C). 74 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(C). 75 According to the IRS Regulations, a qualified appraiser is an individual who (a) "holds himself or herself out to the public as an appraiser or performs appraisals on a regular basis," (b) pursuant to 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), "is qualified to make appraisals of the type of property being valued," and (c) is not i) the donor, donee, or a party to the transaction in which the donor acquired the relevant property, ii) any employee or relative of any persons described in (c)(i), iii) any appraiser who performs the majority of her appraisals for a person described in (c)(i). 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5). However, a person cannot be a qualified appraiser if "the donor had knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonable person to expect the appraiser falsely to overstate the value of the donated property." Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(ii). 76 Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(ii). 77 Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(3). 78 Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i). 79 26 U.S.C. § 4943. 80 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A). 81 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B). 82 Id. § 4943(a). 83 Id. § 4943(b).
The category of disqualified persons include "any person . . . in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs" of the foundation, such as substantial contributors, officers, directors, trustees, and related parties. 84 Thus, a high-level corporate executive, such as a CEO, who wishes to contribute her company's stock to her own foundation may be particularly likely to be subject to the excess business holdings tax. The federal tax law provides very limited safe harbors: 1) a de minimis exception which allows the private foundation to hold up to 2% of the voting stock, regardless of the percent of voting stock held by disqualified persons, 85 and 2) a five-year time frame for the foundation to reduce its excess business holdings if the foundation receives the stock by gift or bequest before imposing the tax.
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The corporate insider benefits from the gift in two ways. First, the fair market value of a gift of stock held long-term is deductible from her taxable income, decreasing the overall tax paid. The tax benefits are especially substantial for top-bracket taxpayers. A donor who is a corporate executive is likely to be subject to the highest marginal tax bracket of the Alternative Minimum Tax, which is 28%; 87 such a donor would receive a federal tax benefit of 28% of the fair market value of the stock. 88 Second, the donor is able to escape the capital gains tax on the difference between the fair market value of the stock and her cost basis, which is particularly advantageous if the stock has significantly appreciated in value.
B. Analysis of Liability under Federal Securities Laws
When the donor of securities is also a corporate insider, the question of liability for Rule 144 are discussed.
Short Swing Profits: Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
The short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates that corporate insiders may not obtain a security and dispose of it at a higher price (or vice versa) in less than six months. 92 This rule requires that corporate officers, directors, and 10 percent shareholders publicly report all attainment and disposition of stock, which includes gifts. 93 This implies that a charity with at least 10 percent ownership of a publicly traded company's stock is also subject to Section 16.
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SOX provides further details regarding time requirements for reporting. According to
SOX, all open market sales and purchases must be disclosed on Form 4 within two business days. 95 SOX, however, did not update the reporting rules for bona fide gifts of stock, which are subject to less stringent requirements: gifts are reported on Form 5, which must be filed within 45 days after the end of the company's fiscal year. 96 Yermack finds that nearly half of the executives in his study sample delayed reporting their gift beyond two business days. and without pretense or subterfuge, be considered a sale or anything in the nature of a sale" within the meaning of Section 16(b). 99 Furthermore, Section 16(b) requires that any insider's "short-swing" profit (the difference between purchase and sale prices for any two transactions within any six-month period) be forfeited to the company. 100 The short-swing profit rule bars corporate insiders from acquiring a security and then disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within any interval shorter than six months. But bona fide gifts to a charity are exempt from Section 16(b) matching.
101
Any charity that owns at least 10% of a publicly traded company's stock will be subject to Section 16. 102 A donor who is required to report under Section 16 and who transfers shares to a charity, including a private foundation created by the donor and for which the donor serves as a director, must report the transfer in the annual filing of (the more lenient) Form 5, or voluntarily reported earlier on Form 4. 103 Ordinarily, assuming the shares cannot be used for the donor's benefit, the donor will no longer have beneficial ownership in the stock once the charity owns the shares. The charity will be the Section 16 reporting party as long as it owns at least 10% of the shares. The donor will no longer have any Section 16 reporting responsibility, with respect to the transferred shares. Generally, the gift is not a sale as there is no consideration for the donor for the transfer of the securities. 114 Yet, the gift may be a disguise for a sale if the donor receives some type of economic benefit from the transfer. Courts have construed the personal benefit requirement quite broadly, including elusive expectation of future economic gain, improvement of friendship, or reputation. 115 It can quite easily be argued that the donor receives a personal benefit when making a gift, as there is a tax benefit. A corporate insider who "controls or significantly influences" the organization to which the securities are being donated is more likely to be perceived by a court to have a personal benefit.
Anti-Fraud Provisions: Section 10b and SEC Rule 10b-5
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In addition, if the charity has knowledge of material inside information through the insider, it also follows that it should be prohibited from transferring those shares until the information becomes public. If the charity will immediately or shortly thereafter sell the 108 Yermack, supra note 1, at 111. 109 Id. at 112 n. Therefore a corporate insider's gift of securities that are then quickly sold seems to resemble tipping with a prompt trade and thus could be in violation of Rule 10b-5 for both parties. sales of stock by "affiliates" of a public corporation ("control securities"). 134 Restricted securities are subject to information availability, minimum holding period, and a variety of other requirements before they may be publicly resold without registration. 135 For shares in reporting companies, the required holding period is a minimum of six months after the shares have been fully paid for, and for shares in non-reporting companies, the minimum holding period is one year after the shares have been fully paid for. 136 Once the restricted securities are donated to a charitable organization, the organization is treated as having acquired the shares at the time they were acquired by the donor.
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Even when the stock earmarked for donation is already registered, if the donee organization is deemed to be an "affiliate" of the issuer corporation (due to, for example, significant ownership of the issuer corporation's shares), Rule 144 requirements -other than the holding period requirement -may apply to any subsequent sales of the stock by the donee. 138 It would not, however, apply to the gifting of the stock from the donor to the donee.
III. Empirical Results and Legal Implications
A. Empirical Results
The Data
We obtain stock price information from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
The insider trading data come from the union of the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (1986 to 2014) and backward extensions using archived annual purchases from the National Archives (1975 to 1995). Our sample includes U.S. common stocks that are covered by all three databases. The time period is from January 1986 through December 2014. Our final dataset has 134 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. An "affiliate" of a stock-issuing corporation is "a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer. Gifts are designated by the transaction code G. The final sample is limited to firms for which stock return data are available in CRSP. Finally, in order to deal with potential misreports and incorrect outliers, we use cleansed data from Thomson-Reuters.
Our gift database also provides two dates associated with an insider gift. The transaction date is the date of the actual gift giving, when an insider donates the shares of their own company. The report date is the date when an insider transaction is made public by the SEC.
Although our main emphasis is on the information content of insider gifts, we also consider the report dates to analyze potential timing games by insiders. Table 1 shows the sample characteristics of our dataset. Our sample is large and covers a 29-year period, from 1986 to 2014, inclusive. It includes all gifts of their firms' shares by all executives in all publicly listed firms. As shown in Table 1 , the overall sample contains gifts by insiders in 9,676 unique firms from 1986 to 2014. The total number of gifts equals 222,561.
Sample Characteristics
Given the comprehensive nature of our dataset, our conclusions apply to all gifts by corporate executives and are not sample specific. 69,000 shares in large firms. The total number of shares gifted is also large, equaling about 9.5 billion shares: about 5.6 billion shares were gifted by top executives and the remaining 3.9 billion shares by officers and directors. The average number of shares gifted per firm is about one million shares. Insiders in large firms appear to gift a lot more shares than insiders in small firms. The average number of shares gifted by small firms equals about half a million shares.
This number rises about 15-fold to 7.4 million shares gifted by large firms.
The average stock price of the gifted shares is about $30 during the sample period.
Consequently, the dollar magnitude of the total gifted shares in our sample is about $300 billion per year. This large amount makes the regulations about executive gift-giving important from legal, economic, as well as policy perspectives.
Measurement of Abnormal Returns
To explore whether insiders time their gifts, we compute abnormal returns 140 by subtracting the return to the equally weighted index of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) stocks from the returns for the stocks gifted by insiders. 141 This approach controls for market movements and implicitly assumes that average beta or risk-exposure is one. Given that our sample contains over 9,000 firms, this assumption is satisfied. Hence, abnormal return AR i,t for stock i and day t is computed as:
for each firm i and day t, where is the simple daily return on the stock i gifted by insiders on day t, is the daily return to the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on day t. For each event date t, these returns are first averaged across all gifting firms i to compute average abnormal returns:
The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event dates as follows:
These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the behavior of abnormal returns around gifting dates.
Empirical Findings
At this point, it is useful to summarize our five hypotheses regarding executives' motivations for gifting of their own company stock: 1) wait until after the stock price has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax-deduction (passive-timing);
2) accelerate the good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) engage in backdating of the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside information about the future prospects of their firm's stock to maximize their donation and tax-deductions (inside-information).
Next, we examine the evidence to determine which of these five hypotheses best explain insiders' behavior. Figure 1 shows the pattern of abnormal returns for the overall sample period.
To get a clear picture about timing games, we provide abnormal stock price behavior before from one year before (250 trading days) to one year after the gifting date. Figure 1 further confirms the timing games. Stock prices rise about 5.5% abnormally relative to the market index during the one-year before executives gift their stock. Hence, if the overall market was up, the gifted stocks rose 5.5% more than the market. If the overall market was down, the gifted stocks fell 5.5% less than the market during this period. Following gifting date, stock prices fall abnormally by about 5% relative to the overall stock market. The absolute maximum stock price occurs on the precise day of the gift.
The conclusion from Figure 1 is that executives are able to avoid a 5% decline in the value of their gifts by acting when they did rather than accelerating or delaying another year.
Hence, by carefully timing their gifts, executives are able to increase the size of their gifts by 5%. Furthermore, for their donations to tax-sheltered institutions, executives are able to take 5% bigger tax deductions as well.
This evidence is consistent with all five hypotheses. That stock prices rise abnormally prior to the gifting date is consistent with both the passive-timing and spring-loading hypotheses.
That the stock prices drop abnormally after the gifting date is consistent with the bullet-dodging, backdating and inside information hypotheses. To further distinguish among our five different hypotheses and to see if we can reject any of these hypotheses, we then conduct additional tests described below.
In Figure 2 , we group our sample by the role of the executives into two separate groups:
1) top executives, including the CEO, CFO, and Chairperson of the Board of Directors; and 2) all
other executives including officers and directors. All shareholders without executive titles are excluded. Figure 2 shows a similar picture for both officers and top executives. Stock prices run up more prior to top executives' gifting dates and they decline less after the top executives' gifting dates. Hence, this evidence tells us that all insiders, regardless of title, use similar devices to time their gifts.
In Figure 3 , we group our sample by decades to explore the time-series properties of executive gift-giving decade by decade. During the first decade of our sample, 1986-1994, executives appear to gift stocks when the stock price was declining by about 7% prior to the gift date. After the gift date, stock prices continue their decline and fall another 17%. This evidence of the decade of 1986-1994 is inconsistent with the natural timing and spring-loading hypotheses, but consistent with the other three.
During the second decade (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , stock prices rise abnormally by about 6% during the one-year before the gift date. Gifting takes place at the maximum relative stock price.
Furthermore, the stock prices fall abnormally by about 6% during the one-year after the gifting date. This decade appears to be characterized by a classic pump-and-dump pattern. 142 This evidence is again consistent with all five hypotheses.
During the most recent decade (2005-2014), stock prices rise by about 9% prior to the gifting date and they fall about 1% after the gifting date. The gifting still takes place near the maximum prices, at least in the short-run. This picture suggests that recent scandals and publicity about backdating may have played a role in influencing executives to scale back in some of the timing games they play around the gifting of their stock. This evidence is most consistent with the natural timing and spring-loading hypotheses.
Next we explore the relation between the size of the gifts and potential timing games.
This evidence is shown in Figure 4 , which indicates a strong relation between the number of shares gifted and the price patterns. Large gifts (greater number of shares gifted) appear to be associated with larger stock price increases before the gift date, while smaller gifts are associated with bigger stock price declines after the gift date. Stock prices rise the most (by about 10% abnormally) for the largest category of more than 100,000-shares gifted (approximately more than $3 million). The increase in stock prices are smaller for the fewer-share groups. For the smallest share groups, stock prices rise abnormally by about 5%.
The post-gift-date stock price behavior also depends on the size of the gift. For the largest size category, stock prices do not decline at all. For the smallest share-categories, stock prices decline between 4% and 7% during the year after the giving date.
The evidence shown in Figure 4 indicates that the motivation behind gift-giving may be different depending on the amount of the gift. For small and mid-sized gifts (up to about $3 million or less), executives not only receive a larger deduction as a result of the gift, but they also avoid the subsequent stock price decline. This evidence is consistent with all five hypotheses.
For very large gifts (more than $3 million), there is no subsequent stock price decline. In this case, the gifting individuals are simply able to take a larger deduction by giving recently 142 This evidence suggests that executives donate stocks that are experiencing extreme declines in price as the stock price falls abnormally by about 30% over the two years. The perpetrator of a classic pump and dump scheme "pumps" the price of a stock by misleading the public about the future profits or health of the company; after the market has absorbed this misleading information and it is reflected in the stock price, the perpetrator "dumps" her position and realizes a gain. Meanwhile, the price often reverts to what it was before the misleading information was injected into the market. To explore the backdating hypothesis in more detail, we group our sample by reporting delays as shown in Figure 5 . Because reporting requirements for gifts changed in September 2002 due to SOX, we restrict our attention in Figure 5 to gifts reported after September 1,
2002
. 143 In the post-SOX period, our sample contains 83,909 gifts with valid transaction and reporting dates.
Our backdating hypothesis suggests that if executives engage in fraud and backdate their gifts, then these gifts will necessarily appear to be reported with delays, even if in reality they are reported promptly. Furthermore, the greater the reporting delay, the greater the degree of fraud.
To explain this further, an example may be useful. Suppose that executives decide to gift their stock on March 2, when the stock price is $50. Also suppose that the stock price started at about $50 last April and had risen to a peak of $100 on January 2 before declining back to $50 at the time of gifting in March. In order to maximize their donation, suppose that executives report January 2 as the date of their donation and take a tax deduction for the trading price on that date, when the stock price was $100. Executives then immediately report their donation in March on Form 4 to the SEC without any further delays.
At this point, anyone examining Form 4 who is unaware of the fraud committed by the executive will deduce the following: 1) executives donated $100 worth of stock on January 2
and 2) executives reported this donation on March 2 with a two month delay. Consequently, all that can be inferred is a late-reported gift. Furthermore, given that gifts are allowed to be reported late in general, these late filings should not raise any suspicion.
To the extent executives go back into stock price history and backdate their donations, these gifts will be necessarily be associated with reporting delays. Furthermore, to the extent executives go further back into stock price history to find even higher stock prices in the past, those with greater delays will have a bigger peaks and bigger declines (ex-post). Thus, the greater the reporting delays, the greater will be the degree of fraud.
Our evidence is consistent with backdating. Second, the evidence in Figure 5 clearly indicates that there is a relation between reporting time lags and the inverse-V-shaped stock price patterns. In the promptly reported group (33,487 observations), stock prices rise about 7% prior to the gift date and they decline 1% to 1.5% during the one-year after gifting. For those gifts with small reporting delays of 3-20 days (19,892 observations), stock prices rise about 6.5% prior to the gift date and they decline between 0.5% and 1% during the one-year after gifting. Finally, for those gifts with large reporting delays of more than 20 days (30,520 observations), stock prices rise about 6% prior to the gift date and they decline between 2% to 2.5% during the one-year after gifting.
That those gifts with the greatest reporting delays show the greatest stock price declines after the gift date is consistent with the backdating hypothesis. Furthermore, that there are over 30,000 observations during the past 12 years in this category indicates that backdating could still be a problem with the timing of gifts. Overall, our evidence suggests that executives are likely exploiting the exemption granted to them under SOX to backdate their gifts. This finding indicates that immediate policy intervention is necessary to bring executive stock donations into compliance with anti-fraud statutes.
As an additional test of backdating, we also classify the gifts by the abnormal stock returns around the gift date. Since backdating involves picking a date with the highest stock price, we group gifts into two categories, one groups showing an abnormal stock price decline 30-days before the grant date, and the other showing an abnormal stock price increase during the 30 days before the grant date. The backdating hypothesis predicts that the group with a stock price increase should show a greater stock price decline subsequently.
The evidence is shown in Figure 6 . Consistent with the backdating hypothesis, the group with a prior 30-day stock increase shows about a 7.7% drop during the next 250 days. In contrast, the group with a prior 30-day stock price decline before the grant date shows only a 6.2% drop during the next 250 days. Once again, this evidence corroborates the finding at least some gifts grants are still being backdated.
B. Legal Implications of the Study
As described above, our study demonstrates that all five of our hypotheses may be in play in various ways. That is, the results can be explained by executives 1) waiting until after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax-deduction 
Waiting for Natural Appreciation of Stock Value
The first behavior which may explain some executive gift timing, waiting until the stock appreciates naturally then making a donation, does not raise any of the tax or securities law issues described in Part IIB above. Although this pattern provides a way for the owner of securities to avoid paying capital gains on the appreciation, this is no different than donating other property that has appreciated in value. This would be a legally appropriate way for an insider to donate stock to a charity.
Under federal tax law, charitable contributions receive significant preferred treatment. tax preference is greater for higher-income individuals because the amount of the charitable deduction is a function of the donor's marginal tax bracket.
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Donating appreciated property, such as stock that has increased in value, provides further tax advantages by allowing the donor of such property to avoid paying capital gains tax on the appreciation. 147 Furthermore, charitable contributions of appreciated property are treated differently from other transfers of appreciated property because the allowable deduction is equal to the fair market value of the entire property, rather than the difference between fair market value and basis -that is, cost basis is disregarded for purposes of the charitable deduction.
148
Although recent studies have shown that the tax deduction for charitable giving may be an inefficient tax subsidy, 149 there is no debate about its legality. Maximizing one's charitable deduction by waiting for the value of stock to appreciate before donating it is comparable to maximizing one's stock option compensation by waiting for the underlying stock to appreciate before exercising the option. In both scenarios, the owner of the relevant securities does not take any steps to mislead the public, nor does she use any material inside information to increase her personal wealth. Waiting for stock to appreciate naturally before donating it to charity is consistent with the 1933 and 1934 Acts' "philosoph[ies] of full disclosure." 
Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging
The second and third hypotheses of executive behavior, accelerating good news prior to the gifts, or spring-loading and delaying the release of bad news, or bullet-dodging, raise securities law concerns. These behaviors have not been without controversy when occurring in the context of dating games played to maximize executive compensation through stock options. 151 In the options context, spring-loading refers to the practice of either manipulating the date of the options grant so that it occurs just before information is released or delaying the release of positive information to a date just after the option is granted. In either case, the executive's stock options become immediately more valuable after the release of good news.
This is analogous to spring-loading the donation of securities, in that the executive is manipulating information to the market in order to make the gift of stock provide greater personal benefit -in this case a higher tax deduction -although the practice involves acceleration of the release of positive information rather than delay.
Bullet-dodging, in the context of the grant of executive stock options, refers to the practice of accelerating the release of bad news to just before the grant of options, or to manipulating the grant date of the option so that the option is granted just after the release of bad news. Our data shows analogous behavior with respect to the executives' gifting of securities, except that rather than accelerate the release of bad news, the news is delayed until after the gift, yielding a higher tax deduction than the executive would be afforded had the news been released prior to the gift.
It would seem against the legislative intent of the federal securities laws to allow executives to manipulate information flow to shareholders solely for personal benefit. Indeed, . 153 Id. at 10. 154 Id. at 13. 155 See id. at 14 (noting that one primary purpose of the bill is to "encourage the voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control" of registered companies).
Assuming that charitable contributions of stock could be viewed as disguised sales, bullet-dodging and spring-loading such contributions should violate Rule 10b-5's anti-fraud provisions. Bullet-dodging -the practice of withholding negative information until after the gift is made -is particularly egregious because it involves actively concealing material information from the public. It also artificially inflates the value of the donation at the time it is made; the later release of the negative information reduces the value of the stock in the hands of the charity, while the donor is still permitted a high tax deduction for the contribution.
In addition, particularly with respect to bullet-dodging, the practice also seems to run afoul of the disclose or abstain from trading rules a articulated by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 156 In that case, where stock options were at issue, the court found that the recipients were required to disclose the positive information before accepting stock options. 157 It follows that executives should not be permitted to gift shares of stock until the negative information, in their possession, has been disclosed. In the stock donation context, the "disclose or abstain" requirement articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur would seem to dictate that CEOs disclose negative information before donating the stocks to charity.
Backdating
Changing the date that a gift of securities was granted in order to reap higher tax deductions is clearly fraudulent behavior under the federal tax laws. The IRS rules analyze the stock gift's value on the actual transfer date. 158 Backdating, in the charitable stock-gift context, occurs when the transfer date of the stock gift is changed ex-post to artificially increase the amount of appreciation, and in turn, the amount of the associated tax deduction.
Backdating of executive option grants was discovered simultaneously by Professors Lie, Heron, Narayanan and Seyhun and reported in the financial press as early as February 2005.
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Researchers showed that managers falsified grant dates to receive options with lower strike prices. 160 The stock price of the company would decline right before the exercise of the grant and increase thereafter. 161 Research conducted in more recent years further suggests that managers are likely to make accounting adjustments favorable to the CEO before option grant dates.
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Options backdating is a practice whereby the date of the option grant is changed to a date prior to when the option was in fact granted. This practice was even easier when the SEC rules did not require reporting of the issuance of stock options until two months after the grant date. This reporting delay allowed companies to wait until the company's stock price fell low and moved higher within that two-month period. 164 The option would then be backdated at its lowest point or near that point, so that this lower exercise price could then be reported to the SEC.
165
Backdating of stock options thus allows the person who owns the stock options to realize larger potential gains, without requiring the company to show these gains as compensation on the financial statement.
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Shortly after SOX was signed into law, the SEC changed its rule to also require disclosure within two days of the option grant. 167 This information must be disclosed electronically, allowing shareholders access to the information almost instantly. 168 Furthermore, the SEC approved changes to New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Market listing standards, which require shareholder approval of nearly all equity compensation plans. 169 The terms of the grant must be disclosed, as well as whether the option grant allows for the exercise price to be less than the fair market value at the time of the grant. Companies are also required to explain the goals and policies of the executive compensation plans. 174 Reports to investors must discuss whether the company has engaged in backdating or might do so in the future and, if so, how.
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In addition, in 2007, the SEC enacted rules requiring full disclosure of all aspects of executive and director pay and benefits, including stock options. These rules require the company to disclose the full amount of an executive's compensation in a single number, and whether a stock option was backdated. 176 If the stock option is backdated, the corporation must provide the reason why. The goal of the rule is to make executive compensation more transparent to the shareholders and thereby end the practice of executive backdating. However, as we demonstrate in this paper, additional regulatory supervision is still needed to ensure the end of the backdating practice.
Backdating gifts of stock involves many of the same economic and legal concerns that arise with backdating executive stock options. Although the link is less obvious than in the case of executive stock options, backdating charitable gifts also weakens the link between shareholder value and management incentives. Executives who backdate their donations receive the benefit of a larger deduction, without a corresponding performance in the underlying stock.
Furthermore, the treasury and taxpayers in general lose when donors of backdated stock underpay their taxes. In order to raise a given amount of revenue, other taxpayers must pay higher taxes. To the extent that executive backdating practices and the executive is denounced for tax fraud, the company may incur litigation costs and costs associated with reputational damage, which in turn harm the company's investors.
Using Insider Information
The final hypothesis presented and evidenced in the data is the inside information hypothesis -executives use inside information to time their gifts for the highest deduction. For example, they may choose to donate stock just prior to a negative announcement that causes the stock prices to plummet. Unlike in the case of spring-loading, the insider-executive does not necessarily manipulate the flow of information. She does, however, time her stock donations based on material information that, at the date of donation, is not available to the public. This remains. In addition to encouraging "vigorous market competition," 181 the "disclose and abstain" rule promotes fairness to public investors. 182 Using inside information to opportunistically time gifts of stock presents similar problems of unfairness as insider trading "in connection with the purchase or sale" of stock. The ability to maximize the value of a tax deduction on the basis of inside information places insiderexecutives at an unfair advantage relative to other taxpayers. Moreover, like many tax loopholes, this advantage is available primarily to those in high income tax brackets, creating skewed distributional effects favoring high-income individuals. 183 Other taxpayers are indirectly harmed by strategic timing of stock gifts as they bear the brunt of decreased funding for government-funded public facilities and services, and higher tax rates than if the charitable contributions had not been opportunistically timed. 184 Further, to the extent that executives often time stock donations just before a decrease in the underlying stock price, the use of inside information to time stock gifts is dishonest to the charities who receive the contributions, who believe that they are receiving something of greater value. Such behavior, if made public, may lead to further erosion of investor confidence.
V. Proposals for Reform
Taxpayers are hurt by opportunistic stock gifting by insiders. 185 Yet, some argue that there is no easy solution. Executives often donate to take advantage of the tax subsidies and if there were stricter rules and harsher insider trading liability, perhaps insiders would not donate stock as frequently. Many studies conclude that donations increase substantially as the availability of tax deductions increase. 186 The government, however, also has an interest in ensuring that gift tax exemptions are appropriately applied for those donations that will serve the public good. Further, the government has an interest in upholding the integrity of the securities markets.
We thus propose four regulatory reforms to address these issues. First, we propose that the late-reporting exemption given to the gifts should be eliminated. Under current law, gifts can be reported up to 45 days late after the end of the fiscal year. Our research finds that executives are exploiting this exemption to backdate their gifts. We propose that the reporting requirements for gifts be similar to any other insider transactions, namely within two business days of the gift transaction. Second, we propose increased penalties for late reporting of gift transactions. These penalties must be stated as a percentage of the amount of the gift and must be increasing with the number of days gifts are reported late. Third, if any gift transactions are reported late, we
propose that the executives be required to explain the circumstances that led to the late reporting and certify that the gift was not backdated.
Because insiders use a variety of manipulative games to time their gifts, insiders'
incentives to use inside information, spring-loading or bullet-dodging must also be controlled.
To address these issues, we suggest an ex-post settlement device. Following the lead of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, we suggest that a look-back provision be implemented for tax-deductions for insider gifts of stock. 187 If the stock price drops over the 90 days following the date of gift-giving, then the average share price during the 90-day period following the gift should be used for the purpose of the corresponding tax deduction, instead of the price at the date of the gift. This provision will help de-incentivize both inside information motivated donations as well as spring-loading and bullet-dodging. Executives would have little or no incentive to manipulate information flow in the immediate short-term to increase the tax deduction because the deduction allowed would be a value averaged over a 90-day period.
Conclusion
This paper explores five non-mutually exclusive hypotheses regarding executives' motivations timing the gifting their own firms' stock: 1) wait until after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax-deduction (passive-timing);
2) accelerate the good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed. Using a comprehensive database of over 200,000 gifts during 1986-2014, our research demonstrates that each of the five hypotheses, including the backdating hypothesis explain at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving in the United States. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one year after the gift date. We find that this pattern on inverse-V shape is stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the backdating hypothesis. We also find that almost two-thirds of gifts are reported late, thus exploiting an exemption given to them under SOX, further contributing to the regulatory conditions that make it easier to manipulate the timing of gifts.
Due to the differing motives that may be in play when gifts are well-timed and the difficulty in determining whether the motive is legitimate, we propose relatively simple regulatory reforms to curb incentives for illicit timing. Our policy recommendations should improve the compliance of gifts with anti-fraud provisions and decrease tax fraud, by eliminated the exemption for late-reporting and imposing a penalty, as well as support the general antifraud provisions of securities laws, by imposing a 90-day look-back period for determining the stock value for purposes of the tax deduction. Furthermore, these proposals should strike a balance among competing policy considerations -by continuing to provide incentives for insider charitable donations of stock while at the same time reducing tax and securities fraud.
Finally, in light of our data showing that stock returns following gifts of insider stock are negative, a charity receiving shares of executives' own firm's stock as a donation might be well be advised to sell the stock immediately, provided that the charity is not subject to Section 16(b).
It is probably also a good idea to institutionalize this rule for all stock donations in order combat any resistance from the donors. (1,000 -10,000) (10,000 -100,000) More than 100,000 
